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ANTHONY CUNNINGHAM

Great Anger

T

HEY ARE ANGRY. AND THEIR ANGER drives them to extreme deeds. Publicly dishonoured by Agamemnon, Achilles withdraws from the siege
ofTroy and refuses to take up the fight even when the tides turn against his
comrades. Only Patroclus's death can call him back so that he can unleash
his wrath. Even Hector's death cannot satisfy the enraged Achilles. He must
defile the slain body; such is his fury that the gods alone can protect it. When
Euripides's Hecuba suffers a betrayal by a guest-friend and can find no justice,
she too must have her revenge. She blinds Polymestor, the Thracian king,
and coldly kills his children, taking pleasure in his grief Hecuba is dead
but for revenge. In Medea's case, anger is more monstrous. Tossed aside by
Jason, the lover for whom she has sacrificed everything, she desperately seeks
a way to hurt him. Killing his bride cannot suffice. She takes her children's
lives, his children, so that she might have sweet revenge.
The stories are ancient, but the themes of anger and revenge are
familiar to modern ears. Human history is fraught with sobering cruelties:
senseless murders; brutal rapes; horrific child abuse; vicious racism; the
obscenity of genocide. War and other atrocities claimed the life of over one
hundred and eighty million people in the twentieth century. There seems
no denying that those devoid of anger and desires for retribution when
the innocent suffer must simply not care. And yet, when we consider how
anger, hate, and the thirst for revenge have figured in history, we can hardly
avoid the conclusion that they have been the mightiest contributor to what
might easily be seen as a history of inhumanity.
Other forces have also been major players in our cruel deeds. Greed,
fear, indifference, and glory have lent a helping hand. Nevertheless, various
schools of thought have rightly surmised that anger, particularly anger hardened into implacable hate, has been first among equals. The Stoics viewed
anger as an inherently corrosive element in the soul. Even righteous anger
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sees only evil; the evildoer is just an extension of evil. Lost in anger's eye are
the complications of what led the wrongdoer to the vile deed. Anger's eye
cares nothing for keen attentiveness to the details that might explain, soften,
and plead for mercy and compassion. Anger sees a monster, and seeing only
a monster can bring out monstrous things in us. Even if beastly revenge is
denied, anger eats away at the soul, consuming and corroding character.
The Christian tradition may seem more ambiguous. The Old Testament is no stranger to anger, and even Jesus angrily cast the moneychangers
from the temple. Nonetheless, the dominant message of the New Testament
is one of love. Every sinner is a child of God. We may hate the sin, but
never the sinner. Hate ignores the divine in every person and turns a blind
eye to the possibility of repentance and redemption. As Jesus warned, let
those who are without sin cast the first stone. Judgment is God's business;
good Christians should busy themselves with God's command to love thy
neighbour.
The Buddhist tradition also appeals to a common denominator. We
identify with the corporeal self, but this self is just an illusion. Our true self
is one we share with all sentient beings. If we can realize this fundamental
truth, we can identify with all creatures and love them accordingly. Anger
toward others makes no more sense than the right hand hating the left. Just
as the Stoics insist that the state of one's character is what matters, Buddhists
insist that one's state of mind is paramount. Enlightened beings leave anger
behind when they see beyond the illusions that foster anger and hate.
Mahatma Gandhi added his voice and actions to these traditions
by extolling the powers of unconditional love. The ideals of ahimsa and
satyagraha demand more than a refusal to act from anger. Anger must be
expunged from the heart and replaced by relentless love, a love that cannot
be denied to even the most brutal oppressor. Anger and hate can never win;
violence can never beget moral victory. Love, and only love, is the answer to
suffering and oppression. Unconditional love can eventually melt the heart
of the most vicious tyrant, even if the road is a long and arduous one.
As suicide bombers claim lives and people nurse ancient wounds with
ethnic cleansings, a world devoid of anger and distinguished by universal
love and respect seems sublime. But like all visions of utopia, it suffers in the
face of reality. Had the vision the power to capture our hearts and minds,
we would still need to know what to think and feel about Stalin or Pol Pot.
Even the best of all psychologically possible worlds might not eliminate the
man who raped Nancy Venable Raine: "Now I hear the words. These are the

words I hear: Shut up shut the fuck up you bitch you dirty bitch you fucking
cunt shut up do you hear me you fucking dirty bitch Tm going to kill you ifyou
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don't shut up you bitch Tm going to kill you." 1 He left Nancy Venable Raine
her life, but he stole her soul. What might we say about anger, hate, revenge,
and forgiveness? A believer in the vision of an anger-less world might tell her
to let go of her anger and forgive this man. But the thought oflooking her
in the eye and mouthing these words shames me, and not simply because
these words would not be mine to say. The thought of forgiving this man,
much less returning love for evil, seems like an empty platitude.
Thus, there can be no denying that anger has caused immeasurable
anguish. Yet, anger seems like a firring reaction for those who genuinely
care when faced with threats and losses at the hands of those who mean to
do them. The question of how anger should figure into a life and character
is one of the most important questions we can ever face.
At its root, anger is an emotional mobilization in the face of threat
or loss. Other emotional states share this root. Fear manifests our anxiety
about the potential for loss. Despair expresses the resignation that loss is
inevitable and hope futile. Grief embodies the acknowledgement of the loss
that fear and despair portend. Anger also faces some threat or loss, but anger
rebels against it. Like these other emotional states, anger involves dissatisfaction, but there is a hostile, aggressive element to the dissatisfaction. We can
understand the adaptive advantages of anger. In a hostile environment, we
must prepare for flight and fight. Fear and anger provide a spirited element
that can help us survive. Fear prepares the body for flight, and anger readies
us for combat. The body's somatic changes all serve the cause of making us
ready. As beings for whom some things matter, we must defend what we
hold dear, and anger mobilizes these defences.
For the most part these capacities for fear, anger, and mourning seem
to be part of our hardwiring. But these emotional capacities also require
development and cultivation. The Greek idea of catharsis often conjures
up the idea of purging emotions. Yet, the best way to think of catharsis
is to think of the education of the emotions. Greek tragedies and similar
experiences can shape an emotional life by inculcating an appreciation of
what things matter and by calling out the requisite emotions to honour
these things in the right way, at the right time, to the right degree. We need
no education just to feel anger, but without some cultivation, anger can
wreak havoc on us. Hot weather, growing old, indigestion, and bats in my
attic can make me mad. With these things we hope for some perspective:
Keep an eye on what matters, don't get worked up over lesser things, head

1
Nancy Venable Raine, After Silence, Rape & My journey Back (New York: Crown Publishers, 1998) 9.
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off heartache, and learn to live gracefully with losses, including the erosion
of your powers and eventual death. In other words, we hope for wisdom.
Some things matter more. Some things are out of our control, others are
difficult to control, and others can be managed with effort and a modicum
of luck. Wise people direct themselves to what matters, duly cognizant of
their own fallibility and fragility.
Wayward fear, sadness, or anger can produce skewed perspectives
in the unwary, the unfortunate, or the unwise. These emotions manifest a
way of seeing the world. Cognitive distortions find expression in distorted
emotional lives, and distorted emotional lives distort the world. Paranoid
people see fearful things behind every corner. They filter experience in ways
that highlight and magnify threats and harms. Likewise, severely depressed
people often see impotence, inadequacy, and despair in all things. In the
same way, chronically angry people ferret out threats and losses that feed
their anger. The fact is that anger in all its forms can be distorted. People
can experience anger for no good reason. Or anger may be fitting, but the
degree may be excessive. And anger's response can be inappropriate; what we
do in anger can go far beyond what anger warrants. Anger can suffer from
these distortions episodically, but anger can also be chronically distorted.
We see this most dramatically and tragically with mad hate, cases where
anger has hardened into a deeply entrenched, dogmatic antipathy.
Consider genocide. Many things can start the wheels of genocide, but
anger and hate usually provide the momentum. The genius of the Holocaust
was that once the system was in place, the machine could run on its own
without constant infusions of hate. Unlike so many other massacres, this
one did not require hate at some fevered pitch. Nonetheless, anger was the
background accelerant that made the Holocaust possible. Nazi Germany was
not a nation of sociopaths. Many of those responsible for the administration of the camps were physicians. How could they kill innocent people?
The answer is simple, though the psychological labyrinths are complex.
Nazi Germany nursed its anger with a systematic prejudice against the
Jews. Conflicts of interest, envy, disappointment, personal distaste, and
fear can demonize the 'other.' The need for unambiguous enemies can be
powerful, even narcotic. When this happens, the details of differences and
conflicts can be pushed aside for over-generalizations chat corroborate the
desired conclusions. Such cognitive distortions manufacture the picture one
wishes to see. With the Holocaust, the Jews became the epitome of evil and
pestilence.
Such collective distortions find ready analogues in individual lives.
Lives are often ruined by misplaced, overblown, twisted, shameful, and
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pathetic anger. The Greeks were right to suggest that emotions need education. This is so for anger, and the world would be better if such an education
were the rule. So imagine that such an education puts an end to senseless
anger. Henceforward, think of great anger in the sense of profound anger
in the face of some genuine, important harm or wrongdoing. Notice that
an end to petty, mindless, immature anger would not keep human beings
from doing terrible things. Avarice and fear alone would be enough to
make people ravage each other. And so long as there is genuine oppression,
cruelty, and wrongdoing, most of us do not believe that any such education
should banish anger altogether. Thus, what are we to say to and about the
desaparecidos in South America, the millions slain in Stalinist Russia, the
victims of Nanking, or the countless victims of the African slave trade?
One response is to adjust our forms of caring. Any education of the
emotions must include the emotions of caring, and perhaps caring could
be immunized against great anger. This approach finds a clear expression in
the Stoics. Only our character is fully within our power, and its perfection
should anchor our lives. Anything external to character should be pursued
with reservations. We mustn't care about anything in ways that might lead to
the disintegration of our character if the objects of our affections meet with
bad ends. We can care, bur not in ways that might alter our character.
While Stoics must confront the charge that they leave out all the love,
Christianity is known for its preoccupation with love. However, Christianity is committed to the view that life is a preparation for eternal life with
God, and this commitment affects love for Christians. Eternal life matters
most. Indeed, earthly and eternal life can hardly be compared; the latter is
different in kind, and not simply degree. This has important consequences.
While some see an incompatibility between Christian love and capital
punishment, the two are theoretically reconcilable because of the strict superiority of eternal life. Christians must see repentance and redemption in
this life as essential preparation for the next. They can never endorse capital
punishment from hate. But the threat of execution could drive the reflection necessary to save one's soul. In the film, Dead Man Walking, Matthew
Poncelet refuses to take responsibility for his role in the brutal murder of a
young couple. Only when his execution is imminent does he repent.
The key point to notice is that Christian love cannot condone hating Poncelet. The gravity of his sins must be leavened by two ideas. First,
the tragedy of these murders is an earthly one. The lesser good was taken,
but the greater good, eternal life with God, took its place. Christians can
mourn the separation from loved ones, but they must also be happy for
them. Poncelet did them no lasting harm. He deprived them of earthly life,
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but given the superiority of eternal life, the loss must pale to insignificance.
Faithful Christians mourners cannot weep for them. Second, while Christians
can feel righteous anger and hate Poncelet's sins, they mustn't hate Poncelet
himself
Like Christianity, Buddhism stresses love, a love that diffuses anger
and prevents hate. We attach ourselves to particular people and see them as
all-important. When those we love meet with bad ends, we incline toward
anger and revenge. But what grieving, angty parents fail to realize is that
Poncelet and their children are one. We share in the essential unity of all
sentient beings. Unfortunately, we build lives around illusions, pernicious
illusions that foster enmity. If we could see beyond the illusion that we are
all separate, isolated beings, we would love Poncelet just as much as his
victims.
No doubt there are Stoics, Christians, and Buddhists that could bring
a Matthew Poncelet to justice without anger or hatred. The real-life Helen
Prejean befriended those who inspired the Poncelet film character. She did
not lose sight of their humanity, even though she saw their actions as sinful. But Sister Helen Prejean was a nun, not a mother. If someone were to
abduct my child, rape her, torture her, thoughts of character, the afterlife,
or illusions about the self would be far from my mind. As loving parent, a
goodly portion of my life is about my child. No grieving parent could find
sufficient comfort in good character, heaven, or the unity of all things to
eliminate loss. Of course, Stoics, Christians, or Buddhists might insist that
debilitating grief or vengeful anger testify to mistaken beliefs about what
or how much things matter. Frankly, even if claims about mistaken evaluations are correct in some sense, I am unsure what difference the truth of
these claims could make to a life in progress. Assume that my love for my
child provides a large part of the sense and meaning to my life. What kind
of 'fact' could a loving parent learn that would somehow banish grief and
anger by rendering a child's death into something that doesn't matter enough
to warrant debilitating grief or vengeful anger? This change would require
a conversion, a metanoia, where core attachments and commitments are
drastically altered. Any such person would become a different person. Of
c~urse, changes of heart can be welcome. Had Stalin fallen off a horse like
Saul and changed his ways, the world would have been a better place and
Stalin a better man. Typically, changes of heart take place over time. Oskar
Schindler did not start out as a humanitarian bent on saving Jews. His
change of heart mightn't be as profound as the change needed for a loving
parent to banish grief and anger, but the example suggests that dramatic
change is possible. The question is whether such change is desirable.
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If an end to vengeful anger requires the elimination of caring and
not simply its alteration, few people would heed the call. The Holocaust
mattered, just as the wrongs done to Nancy Venable Raine mattered. Stoics
might refuse to acknowledge the value of external things. But others, including Christians and Buddhists, would not withdraw from caring. Indeed,
Christians and Buddhists would likely stress the expansion of care, rather
than its elimination. One way that an expansion of caring might work is
by way of forgiveness. The details of the case for forgiveness can vary. One
strain of thought stresses the psychological survival and well-being of victims.
The thought is that anger and hate create stress that devours victims. Life
and character require emancipation from the wounds of wrongdoing; we
cling to anger at our own peril. Another strain casts forgiveness as a positive force and not simply a matter of staving off destruction. Forgiveness is
seen as a gesture of control and dignity. If my psyche is consumed by anger
and hate driven by the deeds of others, perhaps they control my life. The
decision to forgive can restore control and express my dignity to control
my fate and character.
We should be clear about forgiveness since contemporary conversations suffer from a great deal of loose talk. For one thing, forgiving
and forgetting are different things, and many appeals to the well-being
of victims often seem closer to the latter. Any sense of forgetting cannot
be a literal banishment from memory. Presumably the idea would be that
victims would do best to put the wrongdoing away from their mind and
move on. Advice to 'forget about it' can make sense. The advice is apt when
the wrong is not so serious and there is real danger that a victim is unduly
fixed on the wrong. In such cases, the best thing that victims can do is put
the experience behind them; the costs of hanging on to wrongs or working
through them can be too great to warrant the efforts. However, when the
wrongs are traumatic, 'forget about it' does no justice as a piece of advice.
Traumatic wrongs attack a victim's sense of a secure moral order. Studies
with victims of trauma like torture show that there can be no recovery by
wilful banishment. Indeed, trauma can change the brain in ways that create
a sense of being 'stuck.' People who work with victims report that constructing a narrative that provides the possibility for an emotional reckoning is
paramount for recovery. Thus, the last thing that victims of serious wrongs
should wish to do is forget their experience, even if they could .
The fact that people so often talk about 'forgiving and forgetting'
in the same breath suggests that we acknowledge some difference between
the two, but that we also link them. The sense of'forgetting' has to do with
not keeping the wrong waiting in the wings, ready to wield at a moment's
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notice. This idea works in tandem with forgiveness because true forgiveness
involves a change of heart where you no longer hold something against a
person. There is no rejection of a judgment of wrongdoing. If you change
your mind and conclude that you were not wronged, then there is nothing
to forgive. Forgiveness entails a judgment of wrongdoing, together with the
banishment of any claim against the wrongdoer. Genuine forgiveness wipes
the slate clean.
There is little doubt that an inability to forgive wrongs would be a
flaw in character. We are not creatures who can reasonably expect perfection in others. People are destined to disappoint us, just as we are bound
to disappoint others unless we set our sights low. When the wrongs are
minor, a refusal to forgive is a flaw. Even with more serious wrongs, we can
imagine cases for forgiveness. If the details are right, we can imagine an
end to anger and another chance for the wrongdoer. Victims must beware
the pitfalls of hanging excessively on the hurt. But important as the possibility of forgiveness is, those who sing its praises also should be careful
to get the tune right. Some may believe that evil always has its roots in a
cycle of cruelty and callousness that might be destroyed if it could only be
interrupted by mutual understanding and a shared commitment to peace.
This vision, noble as it may be, cannot be squared with Stalin, a man who
burned the midnight oil composing lists of Russians to be killed in the wee
hours of the night. Gandhi would tell us that love could melt this man's
heart. I think not. Gandhi faced Churchill, not Stalin. To anyone else who
would embrace the idea of unconditional love and forgiveness, consider
this: What would it mean to forgive the man who raped Nancy Venable
Raine? The true believer in the goodness of every person might insist that
even a man capable of such brutality is capable of repentance. I doubt it.
The chasm between such cruelty and genuine remorse seems psychologically unbridgeable. And convincing me otherwise would require more than
a profession of faith. Such unprovoked brutality is no accident. It has roots
and one might trace them if one knew enough about the assailant. One
might even identify key crossroads and make meaningful conjectures that
but for this or that event in this man's life, he would not have become this
kind of man. Yet, this genealogy would change nothing about the assessment of his character or the character of his actions. In real life and not
some dreamland, we should not expect to find a repentant soul should this
man ever be caught. His actions were hardly the actions of a man torn by
conflicting desires. For any save those dogmatically attached to forgiveness
as a panacea, asking this woman to forgive this man would be an obscenity.
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Just thinking about Nancy Venable Raine's experience should be
enough to move good people. The likely reaction is equal parts sadness
and indignation, sadness for her profound losses and indignation for the
monstrous cruelty that spawned these losses. Human pathos and inhumanity
move good people, even at a distance. And the interest good people take
in oppression, brutality, and injustice goes beyond some detached, dispassionate judgment that some important moral principle has been flouted.
What we feel says everything about who we are, and good people cannot
witness such things without feeling sympathy and indignation.
If we are lucky, the distance between these deeds and us is great. As
respectful, caring people, we are saddened and angered by such abominations. But the distance holds anything like profound rage at arm's length.
Rage is a double-edged sword. We abhor the rage of Nancy Venable Raine's
assailant. But if we were closer to the wrongdoing, if we were victims, a
victim's loved ones, or a victim's liberators, might our own anger turn into
a rage that might transform our character? Might the Stoics have been right
about anger, and might we all be Medea, Hecuba, and Achilles in waiting?
These victims are consumed and undone to one extent or another by rage.
We should reconsider these ancient characters to see if they have anything
important to say.
Euripides's Medea has disturbingly familiar elements. All we need do is
tinker with the genders. Men kill their lovers far more often than women kill
theirs. In the vast majority of cases, women kill their lovers in self-defence.
Men most often cite infidelity or a fear of infidelity as a primary reason for
domestic violence and homicide. Fata/Attraction notwithstanding, men are
more likely to resort to violence against unfaithful lovers or against former
lovers in the aftermath of abandonment. Of course, Medea does not kill her
lover. But what stops her from doing so is the desire to hurt him. Review
the basic story. Medea falls in love with Jason and helps him procure the
golden fleece. With her father in pursuit, Medea kills her brother, Absyrtis,
and casts his dismembered body into the sea. She knows that Aeetes will
cease the chase to give him the proper burial rites. When they return to
Jason's homeland, Medea uses her sorcery against Jason's uncle, Pelias, who
has usurped Jason's throne. She tricks Pelias's daughters into killing their
father. Having burned another bridge, they make for Corinth, and Medea
bears Jason two sons. But Jason abandons Medea and marries the daughter
of Creon, the king of Corinth. He justifies his actions as an attempt to secure
a future for his sons, but the explanation is unconvincing. At this point,
there is no escaping the fact that Jason is handing Medea a raw deal. She
has sacrificed mightily for him and now she is to be cast aside. Out with
the old and in with the new.
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As she contemplates how to take revenge, she has moments of
conflict about killing her sons. But the thought ofJason's wrongs steel her.
Ultimately, Medea has her violent revenge and flees Corinth with the dead
bodies of her children after showing them to Jason. Even if Medea is right
that her pain will be greater than the pain given Jason, this does nothing to
change the fact that revenge rather than her children's good rules the day.
Raging hate can be like this. Yet the appropriate response to Medea's rage
is that anger can never be better than the angry person. Medea's excesses
are an indictment of neither anger nor love. A good person might think of
many ways to punish Jason. But killing one's children would not be one of
the ways. Medea's attachment to Jason is such that she cannot acknowledge
the importance of any competing concerns and loves. She must have Jason
no matter what. When her love is thwarted, her children become little more
than a means to exact revenge. This is twisted love, a form of moral madness.
As such, it inspires revulsion, not pity. Medea proves nothing about anger
except that great anger can widen pre-existing cracks in character. Modern
readers may sympathize with Medea as a woman done wrong by a man and
admire her refusal to accept the wrong passively. But the details speak against
sympathy or admiration. It is one thing to admire Medea's fighting spirit
as a powerful woman who refuses to suffer wrongs and indignities without
some response. It is something else to look past her specific deeds.
Euripides's Hecuba is a very different story. By the end of the play,
Hecuba's character has talcen a turn for the worse, just like Medea. When she
blinds Polymestor and has his children killed, she is obsessed with revenge
and lives only to hurt him. She mocks and takes delight in his pain. The
possibility that she might return to her old self is implausible. There can
be no return from the dark place where Hecuba now dwells. But unlike
Medea, the details of the story inspire pity rather than revulsion.
Hecuba has no tragic character flaw that fate exploits. She is a good
person. She has lost almost everything in the fall ofTroy and she has borne
the losses nobly. When she learns that the Greeks mean to sacrifice her daughter, she understandably wonders whether life can be worth living. When
Odysseus comes to claim Polyxena, she has reason aplenty for bitterness,
but she bears up with dignity. During the siege, Hecuba held Odysseus's
life in her hands when Helen recognized him as a spy. Hecuba spared his
life, and Odysseus repays the debt by arguing for Polyxena's death. When
Hecuba brings the debt to his attention, the plea falls on deaf ears. Odysseus
mouths galling platitudes about honour. Faced by such unfairness and loss,
Hecuba finds cold comfort in how Polyxena faces her death. In the midst
of her grief she takes solace in the supposed immutability of good character
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and the enduring moral order of the cosmos: "Human nature never changes:
I the bad stay bad to the end; I the good, even touched by disaster, I are as
changeless as the stars." The rest of the play proves Hecuba's comfort baseless.
At this point, Hecuba is no bloodthirsty monster; she is a woman
who has suffered beyond imagination, someone hanging on by a thin psychological rope. Only when she learns of her son's murder and is denied
any justice does she suffer the death of everything save revenge. Everyone
she cares about and everything she can have faith in has been destroyed.
The guest-friend relation between Polymestor and Hecuba is a solemn one.
Polymestor's betrayal shakes the moral order of Hecuba's universe. She could
expect nothing better than the Greeks to slay her children and reduce her
to slavery; such are the cruel rules of war. Polymestor's blow is different in
kind.
Unlike Medea, who acknowledges nothing important but Jason,
Hecuba's many loves are systematically destroyed until she has nothing left.
So long as Polydorus lives, Hecuba can have some comfort in the world,
albeit mixed with unimaginable loss. A least she can live for Polydorus in a
key sense. When he is coldly murdered by Polymestor, what could sustain
her? What might we offer Hecuba? Books? Hobbies? Travel? Old memories? Faith in a loving God? Many have been sustained through hard times
by faith. Yet, perhaps they have simply had it easy compared to Hecuba.
There is Job, but he seems like a feat of biblical imagination rather than a
plausible example of human psychology. Consider Job's descendants. Few
Jews emerged from the Holocaust with a firm conviction that what they
had gone through was part of a benevolent God's master plan. Fewer still
would have made it at all without the hope that someone cared. Hecuba
doesn't have the luxury of a sympathetic audience. Facing the life she faces
is bad enough. When Agamemnon expresses sympathy but refuses to grant
her justice, he adds insult to profound injury. What this says to Hecuba
is something like this: We refuse to acknowledge your loss and share your
outrage; you are utterly, completely alone in your anger, so do what you
will. We should not be surprised if such a world with such a message brings
out monstrous anger. Beastly rage can be the last gasp of a dying life.
Anger does not do in Hecuba in any sense that should leave the
impression that there would be much left without her anger. Hecuba is
a good person with loving attachments and commitments. Grief by itself
would be enough to desolate her character. People who lose everything and
can no longer sustain the conviction that there is a trustworthy moral order
are never more than a shell of themselves. They may not slide all the way
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into vice but surely they cannot hold on to all their good qualities either.
Hecuba's anger completes a disintegration that is integrally tied to being a
loving woman.
Nevertheless, there is no denying the grave difference between a
Hecuba who gives into despair and one who transforms into a dark avenger.
We should understand her metamorphosis as a function oflove and respect.
Because she loves her son and takes justice seriously, she suffers indignant
rage, a rage that hardens into hatred. If she cared less for her loved ones
and less about justice, she might avoid her metamorphosis. But if she cared
less, she wouldn't be the good person she is before her transformation. The
vital question is whether Hecuba's fate is evidence of great anger's inherent
inhumanity.
Looming in the background of Hecuba's case are two rival perspectives that are deeply at odds. With the first, the aspiration is to understand
the roots of wrongdoing, to understand what brings this person to do this
particular bad thing. The emphasis is on the possibility for redemption,
remorse, and change for the better; the evil deed itself is seen against the
context of the whole person and the potential for goodness. The hope is that
there might be some common ground of understanding where people who
are deeply at odds can share an understanding of justice and an eventual
reconciliation born from the mutual commitment to do right by one another. This is a view that hopes victims and victimizers can beat their swords
into ploughshares as they come to see each other as human beings worthy
of respect and compassion. On this view, anger is an affliction, a suffering
voice crying out in the wilderness for the restoration of human solidarity, a
voice that laments the terrible rift that wrongdoing inflicts between human
beings.
This is an attractive view. Of course, the thought of incorrigible evildoers changing their ways is pure nonsense, at best a piece of philosophical
fantasy, and a potentially pernicious one at that. But anyone with a sense of
history knows that many horrible things have been done by decent people
caught up in angry violence. This perspective targets decent people caught
in the throes of potentially corrosive anger. Perhaps we can save good people
from grave deeds if we can only defuse their understandable anger.
The second perspective is darker but no less human. On this view,
our deepest attachments and commitments define us. Our loves shape our
orbit and fuel our passage through life. Serious threats or harms to what or
whom we love attack us at the center of our being. Such attacks close the
door to any compassionate yearning to know chose who harm us or those
we love. Homer's Achilles sees one thing when he sees Hector: This is the
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man who has killed my Patroclus; today he must pay the price. Achilles has
no interest in seeing the world from Hector's point of view. He does not
want to think about the suffering that his family will experience. He does
not want to be his friend. He cares nothing for any remorse Hector might
have. When he kills Hector he is not driven by a detached attachment to
some principle. He is driven by love and honour to revenge.
Of course, Hector's crime is hardly injustice. He has killed Patroclus
and this is nothing more than we could expect from any warrior. One might
insist that he is a party to Paris's theft of Helen. But this has nothing to do
with Achilles's wrath. No abstract principle fuels Achilles's rage. Hector has
wronged him only by killing his friend. For this Hector must die. Surely we
can understand how Achilles experiences this as a wrong in the most basic,
fundamental sense. After all, Hector has slain Achilles's closest friend in the
world, a friend for whom Achilles feels responsible.
I think that the conventional view is that Achilles's wrath is a moral
strike against him. Maybe I am wrong about this. But ifl am not, I would
temper any simple judgment. l should say that it is a good thing that we do
not let revenge run rampant. Locke was right: We are partial in judging our
own case; we tend to mete out more punishment than is warranted; those
in the right haven't always the might to exact punishment; the assurance
of impartial judgment and punishment can prevent a cycle of retaliation.
And though Locke didn't mention it, sometimes we are given a gift when
we ::ire prohibited from acting on our great anger. We would be a lot better
off with people who are slow to anger, particularly where the stakes aren't
so high.
But sometimes the stakes are high. I do not know what more to say
to anyone who denies this. When the stakes are high, great anger is a reflection of who we are at our core. Consider anger's roots. Anger and grief drink
from the same source and neither is comfortable to experience or witness.
Grief can change a person episodically or constitutionally. We hope that
the loss can be limited, that something can be salvaged from grief's wreck.
But if we love and respect a grieving person we do not dismiss the grounds
of grief We do not ask the mourner to "get over it" and "move on." Grief
should not be seen as an affiiction along the lines of a disease. The price of
immunity from grief would be the obliteration or distortion oflove. Paying
this price or asking anyone to pay it would dishonour the mourner. Grief
should command solemn respect.
As it is with grief, so it is with appropriate anger. And because anger
is tied to caring, I understand Achilles's wrath and identify with his rage,
just as I can understand Hecuba even as I pity her. Mind you, I am glad for
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Achilles's return from darkness at the end of the Iliad. Homer's scene with
Achilles and Priam is equal parts grace and insight. The sight of a grieving
Priam stirs Achilles's compassion by occasioning thoughts of his own father.
And these thoughts bring Achilles back from his dark world.
So he spoke, and stirred in rhe orher a passion of grieving for his own farher. He
took rhe old man's hand and pushed him gently away, and the rwo remembered,
as Priam huddled at rhe feet of Achilleus and wept close for manslaughrering
Hekror and Achilleus wept now for his own farher, now again for Parroklos. The
sound of rheir mourning moved in rhe house. Then when great Achileus had
taken full satisfaction in sorrow and rhe passion for it had gone from his mind
and body, rhereafrer he rose from his chair, and rook rhe old man by rhe hand,
and set him on his feet again, in piry for the grey head and grey beard, and spoke
to him and addressed him in winged words: "Ah, unlucky, surely you have had
mucb evil to endure in your spirit. How could you dare ro come alone to rhe
ships of rhe Acbaians and before my eyes, when I am one who have killed in
such numbers sucb brave sons of yours? The heart in you is iron. Come, rhen,
and sir down upon rhis chair, and you and I will even !er our sorrows lie still in
the heart for all our grieving.2
'

In this scene we see the tension between the two perspectives that are
at the heart of our humanity. Take away our capacity for compassion and
you twist and deform us. We should mourn compassion's death in Hecuba,
just as we should herald its return to Achilles. In her case a good woman
has been laid bare and permanently stripped of everything save anger and
hate. But take away our capacity for great anger in the face of threats and
harms to what or whom we love and you threaten our capacity to care as we
cherish caring and being cared for. One can try to construct a psychology
that defuses anger by creating compartments and labyrinths where anger
gets lost or spends itself Practically speaking, I have doubts about the wisdom of such strategies. Anger silenced or driven underground usually finds
some fault line to escape. True enough, entire cultures or subcultures can
educate people to bury their anger. With this kind of education, we run
the grave risks of misplaced, misdirected anger. Today's denied anger can
be tomorrow's explosion. Certainly we know well from empirical examples
of grief that thwarted grief usually reverberates in the recesses of a life and
character.
Yet even if some such strategy works, the strategy dishonours anger
and disfigures integrity. Both grief and anger testify to what a life is about.
If tragedy mikes and my loved ones meet with a bad end, whether through
wrongdoing or bad luck, my anger and grief will be expressions of my fimda-
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Homer, Iliad, trans. Richard Larrimore (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1961) 488.
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mental attachments. They will express who I am. There is nothing poignant,
beautiful, or beneficial about living through such a tragedy. Watching a good
tragedy is one thing; living one is another, and every tragedy is nothing but
hell. Profound anger is neither pretty nor pleasurable; such anger is simply
an essential element in any character with commitments and attachments
that define the self
In the same breath, it is worth stressing once again that much of
the anger we witness is a grave mark against the angry person's character.
Not all anger is great anger. Agamemnon epitomizes petty indignation and
destructive macho anger. With the siege going badly, the Greeks learn that
Apollo is punishing them for Agamemnon's refusal to ransom a concubine.
Agamemnon reluctantly agrees to return her but only if a suitable replacement is found. When Achilles assures Agamemnon that there are no such
prizes left to give and asks him to trust that he will be repaid when Troy falls,
Agamemnon threatens to take some fellow Greek's concubine. Agamemnon
is driven by nothing better than petty indignation: He cannot suffer a blow to
his status. At a time like this, small thoughts should not enter a commander's
mind. Achilles responsibly warns him against dishonouring a fellow Greek.
He reminds Agamemnon that these men are fighting the Trojans as a favour
to him and his brother. As Achilles points out, no Trojan has ever wronged
him and yet he fights, contenting himself with a smaller share of the prizes
even though he does the lion's share of the fighting. If Agamemnon persists
with his selfish plan, then Achilles sees no point in fighting on his hehalf.
Achilles's words are a justified reproach to Agamemnon's rash threat. Bu.t
far from seeing the wisdom of his words, Agamemnon takes direct aim at
him. His response is macho anger at its worst. The threat to take Briseis is
the exclamation point to a humiliating public affront.
The Agamemnons of the world give anger a bad name. Achilles's
anger is fearsome but he is no Agamemnon. Certainly there is nothing to
glorify in Achilles's horrific rage when he mercilessly wades through Trojan
blood to get to Hector. Solemn respect and understanding for anger and
glorification of the same are different things. Knowing what we know about
warfare's effects, we should refrain from painting Achilles as a monster. Take
a person with deep loves and honour and induce prolonged stress accompanied by a sense terrible wrong and you are likely to get an Achilles.
Forgiveness for grievo11s wrones is not always a possibility. Sometimes
anger can only be managed, the way we manage grief's losses. Some wounds
prohibit complete recovery, and not because the victim is flawed or weak.
Great anger that cannot subside usually hardens into some form of hate.
We are used to thinking of hate as a spiritual cancer. Perhaps the lion's share
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of the world's hate should be put to rest as senseless hate. But suppose, like
Nancy Venable Raine, you are a victim of profound, undeniable brutality.
If you are fortunate, anger can spend itself and you can move on. But no
matter what happens, what happened could never fade into something
inconsequential. Could you imagine wishing your assailant well or having
no feelings about him? I doubt it. I find it difficult to imagine not having
deeply entrenched, persistent, powerful desires for no good to come to this
man. This is nothing less than hate. If you are lucky, your life would not
be consumed by hate. But calling hate by another name does not change
its nature. We fear the word "hate," and not simply because senseless hare
has left brutal scars on human history. Hate of any kind is always a burden,
a burden we can hardly wish on anyone we love. But the same is so for
grief
Senseless, misguided hate is easy to reject. But suppose we know
enough about a someone to know that his brutal deeds are consistent with
his character or that the evil of his deeds eclipses any "redeeming" elements
of his character? Suppose we spent time with Nancy Venable Raine's rapist.
Suppose we saw some kindness. Perhaps he is good to his dog or generous
with his buddies. O~e way we can head off hate is to remind ourselves of
the humanity of victimizers. This can be enough to head off implacable
hate. Bur depending on the details, the sensible result can also be hate. The
shreds of goodness can be too small or irrelevant when juxtaposed with the
enormity of the evil.
The idea that hate might have some legitimate place in a good
person's life may itself seem hateful. The idea that good people must never
wish intentional harm on others for its own sake has a long history. After
all, isn't the desire to inflict suffering on Nancy Venable Raine's assailant
a mirror image of the assailant's brutality? The avenger seeks to even the
score. Of course, revenge is ofren futile in the sense of literally evening rhe
score or erasing rhe harm. Even if Nancy Venable Raine's rapist were to be
tortured, his suffering would not change what was done to her. No revenge
that Hecuba might take could restore Polydorus. Hector's death and defilement cannot end Achilles's suffering.
Dire warnings about the futility of hate and revenge make sense. We
cannot be restored from the worst wrongdoings; there is no balm for these
wounds and ta.king revenge never makes us whole. Innocence lost is lost
for good. And when we go down the road of acting on our understandable
hate, we often invite new suffering into our lives. But the vilification of
the desire to return bad for bad is nothing more than a pernicious slogan,
a dogmatic platitude that dishonours emotions that are central to us. This
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desire is merely the flipside of the commendable desire to return good for
good. We curb personal revenge with a justice system, and we are wise to
do so. But the roots of justice and revenge drink from the same waters; they
share a genealogy.
The truth is that we cannot leave the capacities for anger and hatred
behind without changing elements of human character that most of us prize.
Some may contend that these elements are overvalued, that their alteration
would be worth the price to eliminate anger and hatred's ill effects. But most
of us would not make the deal. If a Gandhi can love a sadistic killer, then he
does not love people the way most of us do. An admirer may say that this
is precisely the point. I will not disparage Gandhi's love. But this is not a
parent's love. Neither is it the love of a brother, sister, son, daughter, friend,
or romantic partner. Try as we may to sanitize our emotions, attachments,
and commitments, we must face the fact that there are inherent dark sides
to the things that matter to us. If we are honest, we must face ourselves as
we really are.
While we must not dishonour anger, we must not love anger itself
We can be drawn in by its seductive charms. No life is better for the misfortune and grief of having just cause for anger. We should do our best to
shape the capacity for anger in ways that do justice to the loves that define
us, taking care to discriminate between those things that matter and the
things that matter less. A good world will educate the Agamemnons to leave
their anger behind and eliminate the circumstances that breed a Hecuba.
Great anger should be a precious commodity, used sparingly and only when
the circumstances demand it.
We have no ready term to name the virtue that shapes, moderates,
and mobilizes anger. This is a pity. Given our world, the capacity for anger,
even extreme anger, comes with the territory. Some things should make us
very mad. When American forces liberated the death camps, many commanders forced German citizens to tour the camps so that they might see the
horrors with their own eyes. These orders were a manifestation of profound
indignation and a call to our shared humanity: Look upon these wretched
sights with shame for what human beings didn't do, anger for what they did,
compassion for what was suffered, and a firm resolve to never allow these
horrors again. ·No doubt the gesture was not lost on the survivors. Finally,
someone cared enough to be angry.

